Introduction: Violence Before the Dictatorship
In the collective memory of Argentina, political violence is most often associated with the military dictatorship that ruled from 1976 to 1983. Yet the infrastructure of terror that defined that era did not emerge suddenly with the coup d’état of March 1976. It had antecedents – networks, habits, ideologies, and personnel – that were already in place during the preceding constitutional governments. Among the most significant and disturbing of these precursors was the Argentine Anticommunist Alliance, commonly known as the Triple A (Alianza Anticomunista Argentina).
The Triple A was not a clandestine guerrilla organization or an isolated band of extremists operating on the margins of the state. It was, rather, a parastatal death squad that functioned with the protection, resources, and ideological blessing of key sectors of the Argentine government between roughly 1973 and 1976. Its targets were not limited to armed revolutionaries; they included trade unionists, intellectuals, artists, journalists, judges, students, priests, and politicians—anyone who could be labeled, however loosely, as “subversive,” “Marxist,” or simply politically inconvenient.
Political Context: Argentina in the Early 1970s
The emergence of the Triple A cannot be understood without grasping the intense political fragmentation of Argentina in the late 1960s and early 1970s. After the 1955 overthrow of Juan Domingo Perón, Peronism was banned from political life for nearly two decades. This exclusion radicalized many of its adherents, especially younger activists who combined Peronist nationalism with Marxist and Guevarist ideas.
By the early 1970s, Argentina was experiencing a multi-layered conflict. On one side were left-wing guerrilla organizations such as the Montoneros and the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP), which carried out kidnappings, assassinations, and attacks on military installations. On the other side were conservative forces: segments of the military, business elites, the Catholic hierarchy, and right-wing Peronists who viewed revolutionary politics as an existential threat.
The return of Perón from exile in 1973 was initially seen as a potential unifying moment. Instead, it intensified internal divisions. The Peronist movement contained both radical youth who imagined a socialist national revolution and hardline conservatives committed to order, hierarchy, and anti-communism. The massacre at Ezeiza Airport in June 1973, where right-wing Peronist gunmen fired on leftist supporters during Perón’s return rally, symbolized the irreconcilable nature of these factions.
Within this atmosphere of escalating violence, the idea of combating “subversion” by any means necessary gained traction. The Triple A emerged as a tool for those who believed that legal institutions were insufficient to defeat the left.
The Architect: José López Rega
At the center of the Triple A stood José López Rega, a former police officer, occultist, and political operator whose rise to power defied conventional logic. López Rega became close to Juan Domingo Perón during Perón’s exile in Spain, serving as a personal aide and cultivating a reputation as a loyal confidant. When Perón returned to power, López Rega was appointed Minister of Social Welfare—a post that gave him control over vast financial resources.
Despite the benign name of his ministry, López Rega wielded extraordinary influence. He was deeply anti-communist, believed in conspiratorial worldviews, and reportedly saw himself as engaged in a metaphysical struggle against evil. These beliefs blended seamlessly with Cold War anticommunism, producing an ideological justification for extreme violence.
Using his ministerial position, López Rega allegedly funneled state funds to finance paramilitary operations. He maintained close ties with federal police, intelligence services, and right-wing union leaders. The Triple A, while never formally acknowledged by the government, functioned as his personal instrument for eliminating enemies.
López Rega’s power peaked during the presidency of Isabel Perón, who succeeded her husband after his death in 1974. Widely regarded as politically inexperienced, Isabel relied heavily on López Rega, allowing him to operate with near impunity. Under her administration, the Triple A expanded its activities dramatically.
Ideology: Anticommunism as Total War
The ideological core of the Triple A was an uncompromising form of anticommunism that framed political dissent as a form of internal warfare. This worldview did not distinguish between armed insurgents and peaceful critics. Anyone who questioned existing power structures could be construed as part of a vast, international communist conspiracy.
This perspective was heavily influenced by the National Security Doctrine, a framework promoted throughout Latin America by the United States during the Cold War. According to this doctrine, the primary threat to the nation came not from foreign armies but from internal enemies seeking to undermine national identity and Western civilization. Security forces were thus justified in using extraordinary measures, including torture and extrajudicial killing.
What made the Triple A distinctive was its fusion of this doctrine with Peronist rhetoric. The organization portrayed itself as defending the “true” Peronist legacy against Marxist infiltration. This allowed it to target left-wing Peronists while claiming ideological continuity with Perón himself.
The language used in Triple A communiqués was apocalyptic and dehumanizing. Victims were described as “rats,” “viruses,” or “agents of chaos.” Such language served to morally anesthetize perpetrators and normalize violence among sympathizers.
Structure and Methods: A Parastate Apparatus
Unlike a conventional military unit, the Triple A had a fluid and opaque structure. It consisted of police officers, intelligence agents, union enforcers, and civilian collaborators. This hybridity made it difficult to dismantle and allowed the state to deny formal responsibility for its actions.
Operations typically followed a recognizable pattern. Victims would receive death threats, often in the form of pamphlets or anonymous calls. Their names might appear on published “blacklists.” If threats failed to silence them, gunmen would carry out assassinations, bombings, or kidnappings. Bodies were frequently left in public places as a warning.
The organization relied heavily on fear as a political tool. The randomness of its attacks created an atmosphere in which anyone could be next. This uncertainty was itself a form of control, discouraging activism and fostering self-censorship.
Importantly, Triple A operations often overlapped with official security activities. Police vehicles were used in attacks; perpetrators enjoyed legal protection; investigations were obstructed or abandoned. This blurred line between legality and illegality foreshadowed the systematic repression that would follow under military rule.
Targets: Intellectuals, Artists, and the Cultural Sphere
One of the most striking aspects of the Triple A’s campaign was its focus on cultural figures. Writers, filmmakers, academics, and musicians were disproportionately targeted. This reflected a belief that culture was a battlefield and that intellectuals played a central role in shaping political consciousness.
Universities were especially vulnerable. Professors were assassinated or forced into exile, and entire departments were dismantled. The resulting brain drain had long-term consequences for Argentine education and research.
Artists who explored themes of social injustice or political critique were labeled subversive. Some were killed; others fled the country. This cultural repression was not incidental—it was a deliberate strategy to narrow the range of acceptable expression.
The attack on culture also served a symbolic purpose. By silencing prominent voices, the Triple A demonstrated its reach and reinforced the message that no sphere of life was beyond political control.
Relationship to the State: Plausible Deniability
One of the most contentious questions surrounding the Triple A is the extent of official state involvement. While the organization was never legally constituted, overwhelming evidence indicates that it operated with state support. Funding, weapons, intelligence, and personnel all flowed from government institutions.
This arrangement provided what might be called “plausible deniability.” When confronted with allegations of human rights abuses, officials could claim that the violence was the work of extremists beyond their control. In practice, this allowed the state to benefit from repression without bearing its political costs.
The use of parastatal violence also reflected a deeper crisis of legitimacy. Faced with social unrest and political polarization, the government chose coercion over consensus. The Triple A thus functioned as both symptom and accelerator of democratic breakdown.
Transition to Military Dictatorship
By 1975, Argentina was spiraling toward open authoritarianism. The government authorized the armed forces to “annihilate subversion,” effectively granting them a free hand. Many of the techniques pioneered by the Triple A—forced disappearances, torture, clandestine detention—were absorbed into official military doctrine.
When the armed forces seized power in March 1976, the Triple A did not so much disappear as dissolve into the new regime. Some of its members joined the dictatorship’s security apparatus; others faded into obscurity. The line between parastate and state terror vanished entirely.
This continuity challenges simplistic narratives that locate responsibility solely with the military junta. The dictatorship inherited and expanded a system of repression that had already been normalized under civilian rule.
Accountability and Justice
For decades, accountability for Triple A crimes was elusive. Many perpetrators enjoyed impunity, protected by amnesty laws and political silence. López Rega fled the country in 1975 and died in custody years later, never fully tried for his role.
Only in the 21st century did Argentine courts begin to seriously address Triple A crimes, classifying them as crimes against humanity not subject to statutes of limitation. These trials have been crucial not only for justice, but for historical clarification.
The legal recognition of Triple A crimes underscores a broader lesson: that democracy itself can produce terror when institutions fail and fear overrides the rule of law.
Legacy: Memory and Warning
The legacy of the Argentine Anticommunist Alliance is deeply embedded in Argentina’s political culture. It stands as a reminder that violence does not require tanks in the streets to become systemic. It can grow quietly, through decrees, denials, and delegated brutality.
Remembering the Triple A is not merely an academic exercise. It forces societies to confront uncomfortable questions about complicity, ideology, and the limits of political loyalty. It challenges the myth that repression is always imposed from outside democratic structures.
In the end, the Triple A represents a warning as much as a historical case: when enemies are defined too broadly, and when the state abandons its monopoly on legitimate violence in favor of shadowy proxies, the boundary between order and terror collapses. Argentina paid a devastating price for that collapse—a price still felt in its collective memory today.
Conclusion
The Argentine Anticommunist Alliance was more than a death squad; it was a political project rooted in fear, absolutism, and the erosion of democratic norms. By examining its origins, ideology, and consequences, we gain a clearer understanding of how societies slide into violence long before authoritarian regimes formally take power.
The Knowledge Base 
Leave a comment