New START

Introduction: Why New START Matters

The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) stands as one of the most consequential agreements in the history of nuclear arms control, symbolizing a prolonged effort by the United States and Russia to stabilize the world’s most dangerous weapons. For decades, nuclear weapons have represented both a deterrent to global conflict and a terrifying threat to human civilization. At the heart of efforts to manage these dual realities lies New START, a bilateral treaty that shaped international security architecture for nearly fifteen years. Its legacy and eventual expiration in early 2026 mark a pivotal shift in global strategic relations and present profound challenges to future arms control.

Historical Background: Nuclear Arms Control Before New START

To understand New START, it is essential to trace the lineage of earlier arms control agreements. The advent of nuclear weapons in 1945 initiated an arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, later Russia, rooted in mutual distrust and strategic competition. The first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in the 1970s and the START I treaty in 1991 were milestones that established numerical limits and verification mechanisms to reduce deployed nuclear weapons after the Cold War. These treaties institutionalized a framework in which transparency and mutual restraint could lessen the risk of unanticipated conflict.

However, by the 2000s, many of these agreements had lapsed or lost effectiveness amid changing geopolitical dynamics. The 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) offered short-term caps but lacked the robust verification tools of its predecessors. Enter New START: negotiated between U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, it was designed to renew and strengthen bilateral efforts for nuclear risk reduction.

Negotiation and Ratification: Birth of the Treaty

New START was signed in Prague on April 8, 2010, and entered into force on February 5, 2011, after ratification by both nations’ legislatures. It was envisioned as a comprehensive, verifiable treaty aimed at controlling the number of deployed strategic nuclear arms while reinforcing strategic stability between the two largest nuclear arsenals in the world. This treaty was the product of numerous negotiation rounds and reflected the mutual recognition that unrestrained nuclear arsenals posed grave risks of miscalculation, escalation, and proliferation.

The political climate of the time — with both countries seeking to reset relations after years of tension — made New START possible. Both sides agreed that extending trust through transparency would reduce the likelihood of conflict and enhance global security. Despite significant skepticism from hardliners in both capitals, the treaty achieved sufficient political support to be ratified and implemented.

Key Provisions of New START

At its core, New START sought to significantly reduce and limit the strategic offensive nuclear capabilities of both states. Its central provisions included:

Limits on Deployed Strategic Warheads: Each party was capped at 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads, a reduction of roughly 30% from previous treaty limits and a dramatic decrease compared to Cold War stockpiles.
Limits on Delivery Systems: The treaty restricted deployed and non-deployed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments to 800 per side, with no more than 700 deployed.
Verification Mechanisms: An extensive verification regime allowed for 18 on-site inspections per year, detailed data exchanges, and notifications of missile movements. This transparency promoted confidence that each side was adhering to its commitments.
Mutual Monitoring Tools: Beyond physical inspections, New START permitted the use of national technical means, such as satellites, to ensure compliance.

Compared to its predecessors, New START advanced both quantitative and qualitative oversight while maintaining flexibility for each nation to shape its strategic forces within treaty limits. This balance of mandatory caps and practical latitude was crucial to both securing political support and preserving national deterrent strategies.

Extension and Implementation

Originally set to last ten years, New START included a provision allowing for a one-time extension of up to five years. In 2021, the United States and Russia agreed to extend the treaty until February 5, 2026. Under this extension, both nations continued to abide by the treaty’s limits and participated in ongoing verification exercises.

However, the effectiveness of the treaty’s verification regime was increasingly challenged. The COVID-19 pandemic disrupted inspections, and rising geopolitical tensions — particularly over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — led Russia to announce the suspension of its participation in New START in 2023. Despite this suspension, both states continued to observe many treaty limits de facto, but the treaty’s formal mechanisms were undermined well before its expiration.

Expiration in 2026 and Its Immediate Aftermath

On February 5, 2026, New START officially expired. For the first time in more than half a century, there are no active, legally binding treaties limiting the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia — the two powers that collectively hold the vast majority of the world’s nuclear weapons.

The lapse of treaty obligations has shaken international security. Without the formal constraints once offered by New START:

Nuclear arsenals can be expanded without legal restriction.
Verification and inspection mechanisms, crucial to strategic understanding, have lapsed entirely.
The risk of miscalculation or mistrust-induced escalation increases significantly.
Tension around emerging nuclear powers, including China, complicates any attempt at future arms control.

Even before the expiration, world leaders and global institutions warned of the grave implications. The Secretary-General of the United Nations described this moment as a “grave moment for international peace and security”, urging renewed negotiation and a modernized framework for arms control.

Strategic and Geopolitical Dynamics

The global context in 2026 differs starkly from that of 2011. New START was negotiated in a period where nuclear arms control was bipartisan in both Washington and Moscow. Today, both countries face internal and external pressures shaping their strategic postures:

Russia–United States Relations: After years of strategic competition and recent conflicts, trust between Washington and Moscow remains low. Russia’s 2023 suspension of treaty participation highlighted these divisions.
Emerging Nuclear Arsenal Expansion: Other nuclear powers — particularly China — are expanding their arsenals. Russia and the U.S. have both signaled that any future agreement might require multilateral participation, including Beijing — a proposal China has been reluctant to accept.
Technological Change: Advanced delivery systems, hypersonic weapons, and cyber capabilities challenge traditional nuclear paradigms, making future treaties considerably more complex. Existing treaties like New START did not address these new technologies directly.
Domestic Political Considerations: Leadership priorities in both countries influence arms control engagement. Policy shifts can rapidly alter the feasibility of future agreements.

These factors underscore the shifting strategic landscape post-New START and suggest that future arms control will require multilateral dialogue and innovative approaches beyond bilateral limits.

The Human and Ethical Dimensions

Beyond geopolitical strategy, New START carried profound human and ethical significance. Reducing nuclear arsenals and maintaining verification reduced the probability of accidental or intentional nuclear use, which — if it occurred — could devastate human life and the environment. Nuclear weapons pose existential risks far beyond battlefield calculus, and any reduction in their number or role has been a victory for global security advocates and humanitarian movements worldwide.

Many religious, ethical, and civil society leaders urged renewal or replacement of New START, emphasizing moral obligations to future generations. Even the Pope called on world leaders to renew the treaty ahead of its expiration, stressing that nuclear arms control is crucial for averting a new arms race and building a shared ethical commitment to peace.

Criticisms and Limitations of New START

While New START achieved historical reductions and transparency, it was not without its critics:

Limited Scope: The treaty focused only on strategic weapons — long‑range nuclear arms — and did not cover tactical nuclear weapons, which remain unregulated but can still inflict immense harm.
Verification Gaps: Although robust compared to earlier treaties, New START’s verification regime could be strained by technical or political disputes. Its mechanisms did not always ensure real-time insight into operational intentions.
Dependence on Political Will: The treaty’s strength lay in mutual adherence. When political relations frayed, as seen after Russia’s announcement of suspension in 2023, the treaty’s function weakened.
Inability to Address New Technologies: Emerging delivery systems, cyber capabilities, and foreign nuclear expansion were not fully addressed, limiting the treaty’s relevance to a changing strategic environment.

These criticisms highlight both the strengths and the structural limits of New START as a tool for controlling nuclear risk.

Prospects for the Future: Arms Control Beyond New START

The expiration of New START does not necessarily mean arms control is impossible. Analysts and diplomatic leaders have identified several potential pathways forward:

1. New Bilateral or Multilateral Agreements

Any replacement would likely need to involve more nations, especially China, whose nuclear arsenal — while smaller than those of the U.S. and Russia — is growing. However, bringing China into a multilateral arms control framework presents political and technical challenges, not least because China insists on equitable treatment relative to its smaller arsenal.

2. Confidence‑Building Measures

Even without formal limits, nations can adopt voluntary transparency and notification measures to reduce the risk of miscalculation and build trust. These incremental steps could lay the groundwork for future treaties.

3. Technological Cooperation for Verification

Exploring new technological methods for independent verification — such as enhanced satellite monitoring, open‑source data sharing, and international inspectorates — may offer alternatives to traditional on‑site inspections. These innovations could help bridge trust gaps in future agreements.

4. Strengthening the Global Non‑Proliferation Regime

Broader frameworks like the Nuclear Non‑Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and regional arms control agreements can reinforce norms against proliferation and encourage further reductions in nuclear arms.