Introduction: The Concept of “Safe Areas” in Modern Conflict
In the early 1990s, as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia disintegrated in a series of violent conflicts, the international community faced one of its most complex humanitarian crises in the post–Cold War era. Among the most controversial responses to this crisis was the creation of what came to be known as United Nations Safe Areas—zones declared by the United Nations Security Council in Bosnia and Herzegovina to shelter civilians from the brutal campaigns of ethnic cleansing, shelling, and mass violence that defined the Bosnian War (1992–1995). These Safe Areas would be emblematic of both the aspirations and the limitations of international peacekeeping in the post–Cold War world.
Historical Background: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian War
To understand the Safe Areas, it is essential to first grasp the context of the war in which they were born. Yugoslavia’s collapse in the early 1990s followed decades of complex ethnic, national, and political tensions among its constituent republics. With the independence declarations of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, violent conflict erupted, laying the groundwork for even more brutal warfare in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where Serb, Croat, and Muslim (Bosniak) communities lived in intertwined communities.
Bosnia and Herzegovina declared independence in March 1992, triggering a multifaceted war that would last three years. Bosnian Serb forces—backed politically and materially by the leadership in Belgrade—engaged in widespread campaigns of ethnic cleansing aimed at removing non-Serb populations from areas they sought to control. Civilians became primary targets of violence, as towns and villages were besieged, shelled, and subjected to systematic atrocities. The war saw mass killings, rape used as a weapon, forced displacement, and the near-total destruction of entire communities.
Amidst this environment, the UN was tasked with humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping under the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), established in February 1992 to assist in the delivery of humanitarian aid and to monitor ceasefires where they existed.
The Idea of Safe Areas: Political Rationale and Early Steps
By early 1993, the conflict in Bosnia had reached an intensity that made everyday life extraordinarily perilous for civilians. Reports from humanitarian agencies and the UN itself described large-scale displacement, hunger, and death from both violence and deprivation. Thousands of refugees fled to towns perceived to be safer or more defensible, swelling local populations and creating immense humanitarian pressure.
In March 1993, thousands of Bosnian Muslims fled to the eastern town of Srebrenica, seeking refuge from attacks by Bosnian Serb forces. The situation was desperate, with civilians suffering from lack of food, medical care, and security. It was in this context that General Philippe Morillon of UNPROFOR made an impromptu promise to the gathered civilians in Srebrenica, declaring that they were “under the protection of UN forces,” a statement that would have far-reaching consequences for UN policy and public perceptions. His words were not pre-approved by UN headquarters, but they reflected the moral urgency of the plight on the ground.
The Security Council responded with Resolution 819, adopted unanimously on 16 April 1993, formally designating Srebrenica and its surroundings as a United Nations “safe area”, to be free from armed attack or hostile act, and demanding the withdrawal of Bosnian Serb forces from the vicinity. This was the first formal invocation of the Safe Area concept in Bosnia.
Just weeks later, on 6 May 1993, the Security Council adopted Resolution 824, expanding the number of designated Safe Areas to include five other towns: Sarajevo (the Bosnian capital), Tuzla, Žepa, Goražde, and Bihać. The resolution mandated that all parties treat these towns and their surroundings as Safe Areas, free from hostile attacks, and demanded the cessation of attacks and withdrawal of forces. However, it stopped short of authorizing specific enforcement measures for violations.
Mandate and Expectations: The UNPROFOR Role
The designation of Safe Areas was intended to give UNPROFOR peacekeepers a framework for protecting civilians. Peacekeepers were to be deployed inside these areas to monitor ceasefires, facilitate humanitarian aid, and act as a deterrent to further attacks. In theory, the presence of UN forces would discourage excessive violence by belligerent parties fearful of international repercussions.
In practice, however, the mandate given to UNPROFOR was fundamentally constrained. The force was lightly armed, authorized primarily to observe and report, and lacked robust rules of engagement that would allow it to use force except in narrowly defined moments of self-defense. This mismatch between strategic expectations and operational reality was evident from the earliest days of the Safe Areas concept.
Some observers and analysts at the time criticized the concept even as it was being developed. Many argued that declaring areas Safe without sufficient forces, clear enforcement mechanisms, or a coherent strategy for dealing with violations would create “islands of protection” that were defenseless in the face of determined military assaults. Critics likened the Safe Areas to “prison camps”—crowded with civilians unable to leave and vulnerable to siege tactics.
The Reality in the Safe Areas: Siege and Survival
Srebrenica and the Dawn of Implosion
Srebrenica, the first Safe Area, quickly revealed the limitations of the concept. Despite its formal designation, the enclave remained under severe pressure from Bosnian Serb forces. Shelling continued, and humanitarian access was continually impeded. The town’s population, swollen by refugees, suffered from shortages of food, medicine, and clean water.
In early 1994, the original Canadian contingent of peacekeepers in Srebrenica was replaced by Dutch troops, a battalion that would remain there until the enclave’s fall in July 1995. Despite their presence, the forces were too small and inadequately supported to deter or repel major military offensives.
The strategic vulnerabilities of Srebrenica were well known inside the UN command structure. Indeed, internal analyses suggested that defending all six Safe Areas effectively would require a force of tens of thousands of troops—far beyond what UN member states ultimately provided. Even under the best conditions, the existing deployment could not prevent sieges or provide comprehensive security.
The Siege of Sarajevo and Other Safe Areas
Sarajevo, designated a Safe Area, endured one of the longest sieges in modern history, lasting from April 1992 until the end of the war in late 1995. Its residents were subjected to near-constant sniping, bombardment, and deprivation. The presence of UN peacekeepers facilitated humanitarian airlifts and relief convoys, but they could not stop the shelling or guarantee the safety of civilians in the city.
Goražde, Žepa, Tuzla, and Bihać faced similar patterns of threat and hardship. In each location, Serb forces tested the limits of UN resolve by encircling towns, blocking access routes, and challenging the symbolic protection afforded by the Safe Areas. Occasional NATO airstrikes—in response to Security Council resolutions such as Resolution 836—helped to relieve pressure at points but did not transform the strategic balance on the ground.
The Collapse of the Safe Areas: July 1995
By mid-1995 the Safe Areas policy was in crisis. Diplomatic efforts to end the Bosnian War were faltering, and Bosnian Serb forces, under leaders such as Radovan Karadžić and General Ratko Mladić, intensified their campaigns. Their objective was not merely territorial control, but also the forced removal and destruction of Bosniak communities in areas they sought to claim.
The Fall of Srebrenica
The most dramatic and tragic collapse of the Safe Areas occurred in July 1995 with the seizure of Srebrenica by Bosnian Serb forces. In early July, a well-coordinated military offensive overwhelmed the Dutch BAT (battalion) stationed there. Despite desperate calls for support, requests for NATO airstrikes and reinforcements were delayed or denied amid complex political calculations and concerns for the safety of UN personnel. Many Dutch peacekeepers were effectively ordered to avoid casualties rather than engage the advancing attack.
As Serb forces overran the enclave, a catastrophic sequence of events unfolded. Thousands of Bosniak men and boys—estimates later confirmed at around 8,000—were separated from the civilian population, taken to killing sites, and executed. This massacre would come to be recognized as genocide by international tribunals. Women, children, and elderly civilians were expelled from the area, often subjected to abuse and forced displacement.
Other Safe Area Crises and the End of the Initiative
In addition to Srebrenica’s collapse, other Safe Areas faced severe crises. Goražde came under assault in April 1994, prompting NATO airstrikes—one of the first times the alliance engaged militarily in the conflict. Bihać was besieged and dangerously close to falling before ground offensives by Bosnian government forces relieved the pressure.
Sarajevo continued to be shelled throughout 1995, and Tuzla suffered direct attacks, including the infamous Tuzla massacre in May 1995 when Serb forces shelled a civilian celebration, killing dozens of young people. While Tuzla was never overrun in the same way as Srebrenica, the attacks demonstrated that Safe Area status did not translate into assured protection.
By late 1995, with the war concluding under the Dayton Peace Accords, the formal framework of the Safe Areas dissolved. The accords ended active hostilities and laid the groundwork for the reconstruction and political reorganization of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Why the Safe Areas Failed: Structural and Operational Factors
The collapse of the Safe Areas initiative is not attributable to a single mistake or incident. Rather, it emerged from a confluence of structural, political, and operational shortcomings that undermined the very premise of the policy.
Under‐Resourcing and Unrealistic Mandates
One of the central flaws of the Safe Areas approach was the sheer gap between its legal designation and the resources provided for implementation. UNPROFOR was authorized to act chiefly as an observer and facilitator of humanitarian efforts, without sufficient troops, heavy weaponry, or clear authority to use force to defend civilians. Many peacekeeping contingents were unwilling to risk casualties in offensive engagements with Bosnian Serb forces, further limiting their effectiveness.
Analyses at the time suggested that truly defending all Safe Areas would require tens of thousands of well-equipped troops—far more than the UN member states were willing to commit. Instead, only a fraction of that number was ever deployed, spread thinly across multiple enclaves.
Political Constraints and Rules of Engagement
The UN Security Council, composed of states with diverse geopolitical interests, struggled to agree on robust enforcement measures. Resolutions establishing Safe Areas demanded compliance by all parties and condemned attacks, but they lacked meaningful mechanisms for enforcement if parties failed to comply. There was reluctance, particularly among some permanent members, to authorize aggressive military action that might entail significant casualties or wider escalation.
The rules of engagement for peacekeepers reflected this political hesitation. Rather than acting as a standing defensive force, many UN troops were limited to defensive postures, evacuation tasks, and negotiations. They were not positioned, equipping-wise or mandate-wise, to repel concerted military offensives.
Bellicose Adversaries and Asymmetric Warfare
Another profound challenge was that the parties attacking the Safe Areas—primarily Bosnian Serb military units—did not feel bound by international normative pressures. Their strategies explicitly aimed to break besiegement, compel population surrender, or achieve ethnic homogenization. The Serb forces’ willingness to use heavy weaponry, siege tactics, and ruthless coercion outmatched the capacity of UNPROFOR contingents.
This reality was not merely about military imbalance; it was also about strategic intent. The Serb leadership was engaged in a war of conquest and demographic engineering. From their perspective, Safe Areas, if they interfered with territorial or strategic aims, were obstacles to be neutralized rather than zones of mutual agreement. In contrast, the UN’s approach presumed that parties to the conflict could be persuaded or restrained through diplomatic pressure and symbolic declarations—an assumption that proved tragically naive.
Misaligned International Expectations
The Safe Areas idea was partly born from humanitarian urgency and partly from international desire to be seen responding to atrocity. It reflected deeply held principles about civilian protection, but those principles were not matched by operational clarity or the political will to enforce them robustly.
Many UN member states were more comfortable deploying peacekeepers in traditional peacekeeping roles—between consenting parties—than in a robust peace enforcement role requiring direct confrontation. Thus the mandate and the mission were impaired from the start by a fundamental mismatch between ambition and will.
The Aftermath and Legacy of the Safe Areas
The legacy of the Safe Areas is profound and contentious. On one level, it represents one of the starkest failures of international peacekeeping in the post–Cold War era. The failure to protect Srebrenica’s civilians, in particular, has been characterized by human rights organizations and scholars as a moral failure and a failure of international security architecture.
The events of July 1995, particularly the genocide in Srebrenica, shocked the world and spurred intense debates about the nature of international responsibility to protect civilians. It catalyzed changes in how international organizations and states approach humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping mandates, and the use of force to prevent mass atrocities.
At the same time, however, the Safe Areas episode has also become a reference point for what happens when international promises of protection are not backed by adequate resources or political cohesion. It has informed later debates about Responsibility to Protect (R2P), use-of-force authorizations, and the challenges of humanitarian intervention in complex civil wars.
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